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ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE
For purposes of this appeal, Kalani-Keegan does not dispute the "Course of
Proceedings" and "Statement of Facts" sections of the Appellant's Brief, with the
following exception. The Department states, "On June 14, 2011 Trooper Donahue signed
his Probable Cause Affidavit in Support of the Arrest. His affidavit was notarized by
Dorie Mallory and sent to lTD." (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). Kalani-Keegan does not
concede this point to the extent it conflicts with the Hearing Officer's findings and
conclusions pertaining to the probable cause affidavit, which were as follows:
1. Idaho Code §18-8002A(5)(b) provides that within five business days
following service of a notice of suspension the peace officer shall forward
to the department, among other things, a sworn statement of the officer,
which may incorporate any arrest or incident reports relevant to the arrest.

2. The probable cause affidavit acts as the sworn statement of the officer.
3. Exhibit 2, the probable cause affidavit, does not contain the original
signature of the police officer, thereby invalidating the notary certificate
which follows.
4. The probable cause affidavit does not meet the requirements of Idaho
Code.
5. Therefore, the required documents were not forwarded to the
Department in compliance with Idaho Code.
(R. p. 46).

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Is the Department precluded from raising the issue that its substantial rights have
been prejudiced because it did not assert the issue before the District Court?

2. Is Kalan i-Keegan entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12117 (l) because the Department has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law?

3

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The applicable standard of review can be found in Wilkinson v. State, Dept. of

Transp., 151 Idaho 784. 264 P.3d 680 (Ct. App. 2011), wherein the Court of Appeals
stated:
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the
review of ITD decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or
restrict a person's driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2),
67-5270. In an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in its
appellate capacity under IDAP A, this Court reviews the agency record
independently of the district court's decision. Marshall v. Idaho Dep't of
Transp., 117 Id<!hQ.]37, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct.App.2002). This Court
does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence presented. I.e. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,48
P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho
9
P.2d
.- 23,926,950
.--- - -1262,
- - - 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48
P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual determinations are
binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence
before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine
Coun~y, ex reI. Bd. ofComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738,742
(2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
The Court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings,
inferences. conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional
provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon
unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the
record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.e. § 675279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that
the agency erred in a manner specified in I.e. § 67-5279(3) and that a
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette Counry
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 258 P.2d 583, 586 (1998);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not
affirmed on appeal, " it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further
proceedings as necessary." I.e. § 67-5279(3).

Wilkinson v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 151 Idaho at 786. Further, an Appellate Court freely
reviews the District Court's conclusions of law. Hawkins v. Bonneville Counry Bd. of

Com'rs, 151 Idaho 228,232,254 P.3d 1224 (Idaho 2011).

4

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION MUST BE UPHELD BECAUSE THE
DEP ARTMENT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE.
The Department has first argued that the Hearing Officer did not have the legal
authority to vacate Kalani-Keegan's license suspension. However, given the District
Court's ruling, a more logical starting point should be the issue of whether the District
Court acted in error in concluding there was no prejudice to a substantial right shown. For
if there was no error, the issue of whether the Hearing Officer acted appropriately need
not be addressed. Accordingly, Kalani-Keegan first addresses the Department's
contention that there was error in the lower court.
The District Court ruled, in its Memorandum Decision entered June 5, 2012, that the
Department had not demonstrated that a substantial right had been prejudiced, and thus,
the Hearing Officer's decision, (vacating Kalani-Keegan's driver's license suspension),
should be affirmed. It therefore declined to review the remaining issues, citing Kirk-

Hughes Development, LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. a/County Com'rs, 149 Idaho 555,
237 P.3d 652 (Idaho 2010). This ruling was supported by the record before the Court and
existing Idaho law.
The party seeking relief from an agency decision must be able to establish that its
substantial rights have been prejudiced because of the agency's actions. Subsection (4) of
Idaho Code § 67 -5279 provides:
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this
5

section, agency action shall be affinned unless substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced.
Thus, even if the Department could establish that the Hearing Officer erred in a manner
prescribed by I.e. § 67-5279(3), it still could not have prevailed on appeal to the District
Court unless it also successfully demonstrated that the substantial rights of the
Department had been prejudiced. See e.g. Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho
36,981 P.2d 1146 (1999). The burden is on the party contesting an agency decision to
show how the agency erred in a manner specified under § 67-5279 and to establish that a
substantial right has been prejudiced. Wheeler v. Idaho Dept of Health & Welfare. 147
Idaho 257,207 P.3d 988 (2009). Further, "[T]he Court may forego analyzing whether the
governing board erred in a manner specified by I.C. § 67-5279(3) if the petitioner cannot
show that his or her substantial rights were violated." Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd.
of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228,232,254 P.3d 1224 (Idaho 2011); see also Kirk-Hughes
Development, LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Com'rs, 149 Idaho 555, 558, 237
P.3d 652 (Idaho 2010).
In the appeal proceedings before the District Court, the Department never presented
any argument that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. Indeed, as the District Court
noted, "The Department has not alleged. much less established, that any of its substantial
rights were prejudiced by the Hearing Officer's decision." (R. p. 79). The District Court
therefore appropriately declined to review the remaining issues, pursuant to Kirk-Hughes
Development, LLC v. Kootenai County Bd. of County Com'rs, 149 Idaho 555,237 P.3d
652 (Idaho 2010). The Department notes in its briefing to this Court that it disagrees with
the holding and analysis of the District Court. However, on appeal to this Court, the
Department has failed to demonstrate why the decision by the District Court was

6

erroneous. In the Department's briefing to the District Court, the Department did not
present any argument that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. Faced with no
argument on the point the District Court ruled as it should have. It is not the District
Court's obligation to craft legal arguments for a party, when that party has failed to do so
on their own.
The Department has failed to establish that the District Court erred in finding that no
prejudice had been shown. Accordingly, the District Court's Memorandum Decision
must be upheld. Issues cited on appeal that are not properly supported by propositions of
law, authority or argument are not considered. Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC v.

Kootenai County Bd. of County Com 'rs, 149 Idaho 555,237 P.3d 652 (Idaho 2010); see
also, Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232, 254 P.3d 1224
(Idaho 2011), wherein the District Court's dismissal was upheld on appeal because the
appellant did not show that the District Court erred in finding no prejudice.

II.
NO PREJUDICE TO A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT HAS BEEN SHOWN.
The Department argues that the Hearing Officer was wrong when he failed to consider
the Mallory statement and reverse his decision, and that this violated the substantial rights
of the Department. Even if this argument is considered on appeal, it is without merit.
First, the record does not establ ish that the Hearing Officer failed to consider the
Mallory statement. The record simply does not bear out whether the Hearing Officer
considered the Mallory statement, and elected not to act, or did not consider it at all.
According to the Department's Final Order, if the Hearing Officer fails to act upon a
motion for reconsideration within twenty-one days of its receipt, the motion will be
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deemed denied, pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5243(3). (R. p. 48). In this case, the Hearing
Officer did not issue a written opinion on the motion for reconsideration, but did enter an
Order dated September 20, 2011 recognizing that he had not acted on the motion within
ten days and that therefore, the motion was deemed denied. (R. p. 68).
Second, the Department cites to two IDAPA rules, (IDAPA 04.1l.01.052 and IDAPA
04.11.01.600), and points out that the Mallory statement did not need to be in affidavit
form. While the rules cited by the Department undoubtedly promote efficiency and
fairness, they certainly do not dictate the weight to be accorded to a particular piece of
evidence such as the Mallory statement, and do not mandate that the Hearing Officer
reverse in this particular case.

Third, while the Mallory statement recites that Trooper Donahue signed the PC
Affidavit in her presence on June 10, 2011, it does not state that it was the same
document forwarded to the Department.
Finally, the determination by the Hearing Officer of whether the Trooper's affidavit
did or did not contain an original signature is a factual matter that should not be disturbed
on appeal. As noted by the Court in Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141,
206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009):

This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1): Marshall, 137 Idaho
at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers to the agency's findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp.,
l;lQ Idaho_923, 926,250 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at
340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual determinations
are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by
substantial competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex
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rei. Bd. ojComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, U.3dZ38, 742 (2000):
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Idaho App. 2009).
The finding that the probable cause affidavit did not contain the original signature of
the police officer is a factual finding made by the Hearing Officer based apparently upon
his observation of the document. To reverse and remand based upon the Mallory
statement, this Court would need to overturn the Hearing Officer on a factual issue.

III.
THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT RAISE THE ARGUMENT THAT ITS
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS WERE PREJUDICED TO THE DISTRICT COURT
BELOW; CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS PRECLUDED FROM DOING SO NOW.
Another reason that the District Court's decision must be upheld is because the
Department's argument that its substantial rights were prejudiced, was not raised by the
Department in the appeal to the District Court. Generally speaking, "An issue not raised
below will not be considered when raised for the first time on appeal." Lawton v. City oj

Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 464, 886 P.2d 330,340 (1994); Post Falls Trailer Park v.
Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634,962 P.2d 1018 (1998). Then Chief Justice Eismann alluded to

this very idea in his special concurring opinion in Hawkins v. Bonneville Coun£v Bd. of

Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232, 254 P .3d 1224 (2011). when he said:
In Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC v. Kootenai Coun(v Board oj
Commissioners, 149 Idaho 555,237 P.3d 652 (2010), and in the instant
case, the issue was raised in the District Court, and the court found that the
appellant's substantial rights had not been prejudiced. We affirmed the
District Court's dismissal of the petition for judicial review in KirkHughes because the appellant did not address on appeal to this Court the
District Court's finding of no prejudice, and we affirm the District Court's
dismissal here because the appellant did not show that the District Court
erred in finding no prejudice. I do not understand the majority opinion to
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hold that this Court would decide an appeal based upon the appellant's
failure to show prejudice to substantial rights unless that issue had been
raised in the District Court.
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232. 254 P.3d 1224

(2011). Because the issue of prejudice was not raised by the Department in the
appeal to the District Court, the Department is precluded from raising it now.

IV.
THE HEARING OFFICER HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO VACATE THE
LICENSE SUSPENSION.
In its briefing. the Department argues that there are only five grounds upon which a
hearing officer may vacate a license suspension, and that none of the five grounds
concern the adequacy of documentation sent to lTD by the initiating law enforcement
officer, citing I.C. §18-8002A(7). The Department further argues that, at the ALS
hearing, the burden of proof was on Kalani-Keegan. These arguments fail however,
because the officer's sworn statement is fatally and materially defective, and therefore.
the burden never shifted to Kalani-Keegan to establish one of the five enumerated
grounds.
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(5) (b) mandates that a sworn statement be submitted by the
peace officer, and that sworn statement contain certain elements:
(b) Within five (5) business days following service of a notice of
suspension the peace officer shall forward to the department a copy of the
completed notice of suspension form upon which the date of service upon
the driver shall be clearly indicated, a certified copy or duplicate original
of the results of all tests for alcohol concentration, as shown by analysis of
breath administered at the direction of the peace officer, and a sworn
statement of the officer, which may incorporate any arrest or incident
reports relevant to the arrest and evidentiary testing setting forth:
(1) The identity of the person;

10

Oi) Stating the officer's legal cause to stop the person:
(iii) Stating the officer's legal cause to believe that the person had
been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating
substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004. 188004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code;
(iv) That the person was advised of the consequences of taking and
failing the evidentiary test as provided in subsection (2) of this
section;
(v) That the person was lawfully arrested;
(vi) That the person was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or
other intoxicating substances as provided in this chapter, and that the
results of the test indicated an alcohol concentration or the presence
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code.
(emphasis added). If a sworn statement is submitted that is materially deficient. then the
burden does not shift to the person requesting the hearing to establish one of the grounds
set forth in

I.e. § 18-8002A(7). The concept of burden shifting was discussed in Druffel v.

State, Depr. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002), wherein this Court explained:
The arresting officer observed Druffet's erratic driving pattern, noticed
Druffel's speech was slurred and smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming
from Druffel, and watched Druffel fail the field sobriety tests. Druffel then
consented to the Intoxilizer test, which produced BAC results greater than
the legal limit. In addition, the calibration, certification and quality control
of the Intoxilizer test all met the required standards thus the affidavit of the
arresting officer was sufficient to shift the burden to Druffel.
(emphasis added), Druffel. 136 Idaho at 856.
In the case at bar, the Hearing Officer made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law pertaining to the probable cause affidavit:
1. Idaho Code §18-8002A(5)(b) provides that within five business days

following service of a notice of suspension the peace officer shall forward
to the department, among other things, a sworn statement of the officer,
which may incorporate any arrest or incident reports relevant to the arrest.
2. The probable cause affidavit acts as the sworn statement of the officer.
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3. Exhibit 2, the probable cause affidavit, does not contain the original
signature of the police officer. thereby invalidating the notary certificate
which follows.
4. The probable cause affidavit does not meet the requirements of Idaho
Code.
5. Therefore, the required documents were not forwarded to the
Department in compliance with Idaho Code.
(R. p. 46).

Because, as the Hearing Officer found, the affidavit was not compliant with the
requirements of Idaho Code, due to the lack of an original signature thereon, the burden
never shifted to Kalani-Keegan to establish one of the grounds for relief enumerated in

I.e. 18-8002A(7), as this was a material defect in the affidavit.
The Department also argues that, "Assuming the sufficiency of the officer's signature
was at issue, it was the petitioner's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence.
that the officer's signature was flawed. She failed. The record contains no evidence
challenging the officer's signature." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 6). This argument fails for two
reasons. As previously noted, the burden never shifted to Kalani-Keegan to prove
anything. because the Hearing Officer determined the affidavit did not meet the
requirements of Idaho Code. Second, even if it was Kalani-Keegan's burden, the burden
was met by virtue of evidence in the record. The Hearing Officer presumptively had
possession of. or access to, the original copies of the documents that were sent to the
Department. including the sworn statement. He made a factual determination, apparently
based upon his own observation, that the affidavit did not contain the original signature
of the police officer. Thus his findings and conclusions were supported by evidence in the
record. That this issue was raised by the Hearing Officer, rather than counsel, is

12

immaterial.
The Department cites to Kane v. State, Dept. of Transp. , 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130
(Idaho App. 2003). Kane is distinguishable. Kane had argued at his ALS hearing that the
administrative license suspension was invalid because: (1) Officer Erickson's affidavit
submitted to the lTD was on the wrong form and thus did not meet the requirement of

I.e. § 18-8002A(5) that the sworn statement be made "on forms in accordance with rules
adopted by the department"; (2) in addition to being on the wrong form, Officer
Erickson's affidavit did not contain all of the information required by

I.e.

§ 18-8002A(5).

Precisely what information was allegedly lacking from the affidavit is not specified. With
regard to the affidavit issue, the Hearing Officer concluded that the officer's affidavit did
comply with statutory requirements. On judicial review, the District Court affirmed the
Hearing Officer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that "Section 18-8002A(7)
specifies that the hearing officer "shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds "one of
the five enumerated bases to set aside a suspension. Therefore, a hearing officer is not
authorized to vacate a suspension based upon technical flaws in documents delivered to
the ITD." The Court also stated that it was Kane's "burden to prove that, infact, the
officer lacked legal cause to stop Kane's vehicle or that the blood test was, infact. not
conducted in accordance with legal requirements. This burden is not met by merely
showing that documents in the hands of the ITD are inadequate or inadmissible to reveal
whether legal cause existed or whether the blood test was conducted properly."
The case at bar does not involve questions about "technical flaws" in a document
delivered to lTD, nor about whether Kalani-Keegan met her burden at hearing. Rather,
the issue presented here is whether the burden ever shifted to Kalani-Keegan because of

13

the materially defective sworn statement. Kalani-Keegan respectfully contends it did not.

v.
KALANI-KEEGAN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-117(1).
Kalani-Keegan is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal as the Department!
has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Idaho Code § 12-117(1), which
provides authority for such an award, states:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Clearly under the new amendments to the statute, the legislature intended that it apply to
appeals such as this one. As amended, Idaho Code 12-1l7(S)(c) provides:
(c) "Proceeding" means any administrative proceeding, administrative
judicial proceeding, civil judicial proceeding or petition for judicial review
or any appeal from any administrative proceeding, administrative judicial
proceeding, civil judicial proceeding or petition for judicial review.

1 The Department of Transportation is clearly a "state agency"' as contemplated by I.e. § 12-117. The term
"state agency" is defined in Idaho Code § 12-117(5)(d) as "any agency as defined in section 67-5201, Idaho
Code". Under I.e. § 67-5201(2), ""Agency" means each state board, commission. department or officer
authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases, but does not include the legislative or
judicial branches, executive officers listed in section 1. article IV, of the constitution of the state of Idaho in
the exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively from the constitution, the state militia or the state
board of correction." There is no question that the Department is authorized by law to make rules, (See I.e.
lS-S002A; IDAPA 39.02.72 "Rules Governing Administrative License Suspensions") and is authorized to
determine contested cases (See I.C. §§ lS-S002A(l)(f). lS-S002A(7)). (Under I.e. §67-5201 (6), a
""Contested case" means a proceeding which results in the issuance of an order.·' I.e. §67 -5240 further
provides, "A proceeding by an agency, other than the public utilities commission or the industrial
commission, that may result in the issuance of an order is a contested case and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter. except as provided by other provisions of law.")
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This Court discussed the post-amendment version of Idaho Code § 12-117 in the
case of In re Jerome County Board o/Commissioners, 153 Idaho 298, 281 P.3d
1076 (2012):
Thus, this statute now requires this Court on appeal to award a prevailing
party reasonable attorney fees if we find that the nonprevailing party did
not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law on appeal. See also Reardon
v. City 0/ Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004) rev'd on
other grounds. City o/Osburn 1'. Randel, Idaho _,277 P.3d 353 (2012».

In re Jerome County Board o.fCommissioners, 281 P.3d at 1095-1096.
Some examples of instances wherein the Court found that a party did not act with a
reasonable basis in fact or law on appeal have included, a Board of County
Commissioners acting contrary to an unambiguous state statute and a local ordinance in

Gardiner v. Boundary County Bd. o.fCom'rs, 148 Idaho 764, 229 P.3d 369 (Idaho 2010);
an unreasonable construction of a statute advanced in Daw ex reI. Daw v. School Dist. 91

Bd. o.fTrustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (Idaho 2001); and a situation wherein
appellants "were very clearly aware of the statutory procedures, failed to appeal separate
appraisals when they had a right to appeal, and were clearly advised on the applicable law
in an articulate and well reasoned written decision from the District Court", yet "chose to
further appeal that decision

to

this Court, even though they failed to add any new analysis

or authority to the issues raised below" in Castringo v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106 P.3d
419 (Idaho 2005).
In the case at bar, Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) is clear and unambiguous, mandating that,
"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action

shall be affirmed unless substantial rights o.f the appellant have been prejudiced."
(emphasis added). As recognized by the District Court in a clear and well founded
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opinion, the Department never alleged, much less established, that substantial rights had
been prejudiced. This was plainly the Department's burden to establish, but it failed to
advance any argument on the point to the District Court. The District Court was therefore
clearly correct in its decision. In spite of this fact, the Department frivolously appealed to
this Court, raising its prejudice argument for the first time here. but wholly failing to
establish why the District Court acted in error. Under these circumstances, the
Department has acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. and an award of
attorney's fees and costs is appropriate.
VI.
CONCLUSION
The Department has failed to show that the District Court erred in concluding the
Department had not established prejudice to its substantial rights in the proceedings
below. Even were the Department successful in so doing, it has not shown to this Court
that its substantial rights were in fact prejudiced. Additionally, the Department failed to
raise the issue of prejudice to substantial rights in the District Court below, and is
precluded from raising that issue in this appeal. Finally, the Hearing Officer did act
within his authority in vacating Kalani-Keegan's license suspension, as the affidavit did
not comply with the requirements of the Idaho Code due to the fact the affidavit did not
bear the original signature of the officer. This was a material defect, and thus the burden
never shifted to Kalani-Keegan to establish one of the five enumerated bases to set aside
a suspension. Accordingly, the District Court's decision, and the Hearing Officer's
findings and conclusions. must be upheld. Finally, Kalani-Keegan is entitled to an award
of attorney's fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-117, because the
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Department, on appeal, has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

-U- day of December, 2012.

GREGKOR~
Attorney for Respondent
Marina P. Kalani-Keegan
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Susan K. Servick
Special Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 2900
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